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In the 1930s in Hungary, the periodical Magyar Szemle (Hungarian Review) ranked
as the foremost intellectual review of conservative thinking. Edited by the pro-es-
tablishment historian Gyula Szekfû, the journal provided important intellectual am-
munition to the traditionalists of the right, in other words those who for various rea-
sons sought to hold on to István Bethlen’s version of moderate conservatism in ide-
ology and a parliamentary system of limited pluralism and authoritarian checks in
practice. The 1930s, however, bore witness to several challenges to the Horthy re-
gime. The rise of the extreme right and the emancipatory (though often also fer-
vently nationalist) program of the so-called népi (populist or narodniki) writers pre-
sented coherent political alternatives to the prevailing order for the first time since
the marginalization and emaciation of the left in the wake of the 1918–19 revolu-
tions. Simultaneously, the country had to grapple with the emergence of Nazi Ger-
many as an expansionist great power in the region. In this complicated situation, au-
thors of Magyar Szemle confronted what they perceived as a dual threat: the increas-
ing appeal of German imperialism and German political and historical thinking.
Many intellectuals of the time, feeling that the German political challenge should be
resisted through the adoption and adaptation of innovative German thinking on poli-
tics and history, espoused the new ideologies emanating from the unquestioned cul-
tural center of Central Europe in some form. Magyar Szemle, however, emerged as a
hub for public intellectuals who sought to hold on to a conservatism both more tradi-
tional and more open to some of the ideas of liberalism and who refused to abandon
the established view of Hungarian history for a more ethnically conscious vision of
the past. In the context of the dual German challenge of the 1930s, Magyar Szemle
represented a site of intellectual resistance not so much against direct German politi-
cal ambitions but against the new wave of German political thought and interpreta-
tions of history.
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The Rise of the Völkisch Idea in German Historiographical
and Political Thought
Germany in the 1920s seemed almost beyond comprehension and explanation
even to its contemporaries. Every observer noted that a vast process of ideological
and cultural fermentation was underway. The meanings of key political terms,
foundational concepts of social and state life, were changing, while various
groups, periodicals and institutions were taking shape, ceasing to exist, undergo-
ing transformations, or falling into insignificance. Nonetheless, with the passing
of years it became increasingly evident that this process had spilled over in a par-
ticular direction: an ideology had acquired solid form that, having expelled the
one-time right-wing and left-wing companions-in-arms as now ideologically in-
compatible, was articulating ever more clearly its views and conception of the
world. The new notions around which völkisch conservative revolutionary think-
ing was organized reinterpreted the relationship between state and nation.
Whereas before 1914 the Prussian heritage, in other words the cult of the state,
had unambiguously marked the mentality, from the realm of scholarship to the
public square, after 1919 a new actor gained increasing prominence in German
history and the vision of a brighter German future: the Volk.
Historicism, the view of the past that had dominated German historiography
throughout much of the 19th century and well into the 20th, proceeded from the
hypothesis that in the course of history specific political and conceptual forces ex-
ercise an influence in accordance with the exigencies of different eras and the pre-
vailing thought of a given period.1 These forces are manifest first and foremost in
the organization of the state, which can be conceptualized as the objective form of
political will and ideas. Accordingly, the state represents a scale of values and
strives to attain set goals. In the international context these goals can come into
conflict with one another, but they are also subject to change. The conception of
the state itself can be permanent, but the path leading to its political realization and
its realization itself change as a function of prevailing circumstances. Thus for the
historicist, ideas and Realpolitik create and write history collectively. It is how-
ever important to note that each of these actors, as it were, is conceived of as a
product of history, indeed the historical nature of their being is their most basic
quality. For this reason there can exist no generally applicable measure of validity.
The political conduct of a state must be analyzed as the course of a particular idea
and institutional system, both products of history, moving ever closer to the at-
tainment of perfection.
The Volk, the subject of the new cult, brought with it a reassessment of the past
and a newly formed image of the future. The most intellectually active forces of
the German right began to seek the answer to the question of the nature and sub-
stance of the (alleged) peculiar German quality, the “core” (the German Volkstum)
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that, independent of history, distinguished Germans from all other nations. In the
history of ideas the products of this conception and the perspectives to which it
gave shape are denoted with the expression völkischer Gedanke, or völkisch idea,
while the larger processes of intellectual fermentation are known as the “conser-
vative revolution” or “young conservatism”.
Many members of the old right-wing intellectual elite and professors occupy-
ing influential positions in academic life were unable to identify with the new
manner of thinking. They did not vanish from public life, although their informal
positions were shaken, and henceforth they no longer determined the guiding
principles and terminologies of political and historical thinking. For many mem-
bers of the younger generation and innumerable public groups, not to mention
right-wing political forces, their conceptions, which seemed too Western and lib-
eral and at the same time too conservative, were no longer decisive. Their think-
ing, which emphasized the strength of the state and history, was unacceptable for
many, as the German state had cracked and almost crumbled in 1918 and 1919,
and history had seemed to forsake the nation. New ideas were needed that would
prove that other, more enduring, forces would counterbalance political failure.
Thus for many the notion according to which the German Volk was an eternal
force, independent of the state and capable of defying history, was appealing.
More so than ever, the prevailing winds of the new era were “German winds”.
According to the emerging view of history, race and state, the Volk bears its
own idea within itself and struggles in the course of history for self-realization. In
this context historical will, which 19th century historicism conceives of as inten-
tion brought into being in the form of a state, is not the product of historical possi-
bilities and exigencies, but the temporal manifestation of an ahistorical instinct. In
other words the roots of the identity of a historical agent do not lie in history itself,
but rather exist a priori as ideas or völkisch character that predates statehood.
From this point of view, whether a narrative proceeds from the concept of the
Volkstum or the race is of secondary importance. In other words Volksgeschichte
is essentially compatible with racial history (Rassengeschichte), understood in the
strict sense of the term. In both cases the important thing is that the “individuality
of the German people” is posited as a quality existing above history, the constancy
of which in the face of changes is functionally and textually more important than
its source in race or ethnic group.2
In the ideology of Volksgeschichte, the state springs from the Volk, and the
measure of its workings is their correspondence to the character of the Volk, the
balance of the achievements and failings in the creation of the conditions neces-
sary for its development. The goal of social history was to reveal this eternal eth-
nic character and demarcate the range of its influence. The historiographical re-
flection of this school of thought thus also preserved the fundamental premise ac-
cording to which “the ‘Volk’ precedes the state”.3 One of the vital tasks of this his-
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toriography in the demarcation of historical periods was the establishment of peri-
ods of (alleged) ascension and (alleged) decline, of the “rise” and “ebb” of the
tides of the Volk.4 Parallel to this, however, it strove to reveal the ahistorical sub-
stance, the posited permanence awaiting discovery beneath the flow of political
history. In other words it endeavored to give a historical reconstruction of “the in-
imitable soul, impossible to counterfeit, of the Volk, bound to the soil and to its
homeland,” to use the words of Adolf Helbok, one of the radical ideologues of
Volkstumsforschung.5
The völkisch idea and German great power ideology were molded together in
the revised concept of Mitteleuropa, which itself proved to be a very elastic
model. Its prototype was the Ottonian Empire, but its territory extended far be-
yond these borders.6 Its single function was clear: “by giving form to Central Eu-
rope, to rise to be the leading nation of Europe”, in other words to assume simulta-
neously its pan-German völkisch and supranational regional roles and meet the
greatest task springing from the idea of the Volkstum.7
The ideology of the Third Reich integrated this heritage, as it embedded poli-
tics deeply in a myth of destiny and Volk, although mixed with a kind of cult of
technology and the future that was characteristic of very few of the currents of the
conservative revolution.8 Thus the völkisch idea, which became the canon under
the Weimar Republic and was linked to notions of order and empire under the
Third Reich (although maintaining its essential contents), bore peculiarly Ger-
man, anti-liberal and often anti-modernist ideological connotations. In its final
and most propagandistic incarnation under National Socialism the term eventu-
ally became a strategic ideologeme expressing transcendence of social disparities
and differences of worldview, signifying bonds more general even than the state,
and mandating eastward expansion (territorial or political) as a direct outgrowth
of the geographical position and political character of the German Volk.
Initial Responses to Volksgeschichte in Hungary
The reception of the scholarship of the Weimar Republic in Hungary seems to
have been a bit slow if one considers that the educated stratum of Hungarian pub-
lic life followed trends in the German academia with close attention. On the other
hand, it could be regarded as surprisingly fast in comparison with the reception of
late historicism, which took some fifty years to show its influence in Hungary. It is
worthwhile to identify the basic milestones of this process. Towards the end of the
1920s one can discern in the pages of the journals Századok (Centuries) and Ma-
gyar Szemle, first in the reviews and later in articles, a tendency to interpret Ger-
man völkisch history as a political threat. In this context there was no rift between
Hungarian scholarly life and public discourses. The concept of völkisch
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Mitteleuropa constituted a threat to the existence of the Hungarian nation because
it regarded a considerable part of the historical (and present) lands of the country
as German Volksboden and an even larger part as German Kulturboden. From this
perspective every German work that dealt with the geography, culture or history
of the German communities of Hungary was interpreted as a challenge to the am-
bition of Hungarian politics to assert control in the region. This sense of threat was
reinforced by the swing to the right in German politics, but also by the debate that
had broken out well before 1933 among the German communities of Hungary
concerning their identity as members of the Hungarian political community or the
German Volk. At stake was the question of whether the German minority would
define itself collectively with reference to the Hungarian state or the German fa-
therland. In other words, would it withdraw from the community of the host state
and thereby implicitly also from its jurisdiction?9
Parallel to the reception of new German expansionist thinking, a rupture took
place in the Hungarian scholarly community, and the battle between historicism
and the völkisch view of the past began. The goal for both tendencies was to avert
the danger of the German threat, but they nonetheless came into conflict with each
other because of their profound ideological differences. A történetírás új útjai
(The New Paths of Historiography), edited by Bálint Hóman and published in
1931, attests clearly to the fact that the reception of the methods and theories of
German scholarship in Hungary had not yet identified the profoundly divisive rift
in German historiography between late historicism and Volksgeschichte.10 Both
Gyula Szekfû and Elemér Mályusz contributed to the volume, both under the
heading of Geistesgeschichte, which each author used as a synonym for contem-
porary historiography. In contrast, in German historiography there had been a
continuous debate since the publication of the works of social history by Karl
Lamprecht on the constitution of the Volk and the collective psyche. The last stage
of the debate in Germany was the canonization of the völkisch reading of history
described above, which also represented the close of the historicist era. The initial
obliviousness to this debate in Hungary and its subsequent sudden incorporation
into scholarly thinking is illustrated again by the fact that in 1932 Szekfû wrote the
preface to A magyar nemzet története az õsidõktõl napjainkig (The History of the
Hungarian Nation from Ancient Times to the Present Day), by Miklós Asztalos
and Sándor Pethõ.11 In 1934, however, when Asztalos’s text was published as an
independent volume with only slight modifications,12 Szekfû attacked his views
in a highly critical review published in Magyar Szemle. His review, which had the
dimensions of a self-standing essay, was entitled Népiség, nemzet és állam
(Volkstum, Nation, State). It has since become famous as the first reaction of
Hungarian historicism and conservatism, not to the German challenge, but to the
new methodology of historiography stemming from the völkisch school of
thought.13
MAGYAR SZEMLE AND THE VÖLKISCH IDEOLOGY 85
In the 1930s Magyar Szemle, the representative conservative periodical, con-
tinued to publish reviews and articles on the institutional and methodological in-
novations of German historical scholarship every year. In the light of these, in
1934 Volksgeschichte, which initially and quite inexplicably had simply been
thought of as part of Geistesgeschichte, was given separate treatment, both by his-
torians and in public discourse. In contrast to Szekfû, the young although already
well-known Mályusz believed that in opposition to German Volksgeschichte,
which functioned to legitimize German supremacy, Hungarian historiography
should emphasize Hungarian Volksgeschichte. In other words Hungarian histori-
ans should borrow their model from German scholarship, although with the aim of
fighting off German political ambitions. However, Mályusz’s approach de-
manded the use of terminological and conceptual tools viewed by the authors of
Magyar Szemle as inapplicable to Hungary (as they expressed in a series of arti-
cles beginning in 1935).14 Thus a methodological and theoretical debate became
inevitable.15
The spark that ignited the debate was, as already mentioned, the publication in
1934 of Asztalos’s A nemzetiségek története Magyarországon a betelepülésüktõl
máig, the first work of Hungarian historiography deliberately written from the
perspective of Volksgeschichte (although it bore numerous traces of the tradi-
tional view of history as well). In 1928 Asztalos, who had completed his doctorate
in 1922, took a long trip to Germany, where he became familiar with the method-
ologies of Volksgeschichte.16 His oeuvre exemplifies how an author who began on
the history of nationalities came to found the school of Hungarian Volks-
geschichte on the basis of the methodologies of German scholarship. A nemzeti-
ségek története Magyarországon focuses on the collapses, in Asztalos’ view in-
separably intertwined, of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Hungarian state. In his
analysis of the processes of collapse, the premises of German Volksgeschichte, ac-
cording to which the history of the Habsburg state should be read first and fore-
most as a history of dissolution, entered into a synergistic relationship with the no-
tion of the viability of the Hungarian state. The Volksgeschichte critique of the
idea of multinational statehood offered an explanation as to why historical Hun-
gary, seen otherwise by Asztalos as viable, disintegrated. Its fall was a conse-
quence of the place it held in the larger framework of a multinational state, in other
words a state that stood in opposition to the ineluctable energies of the Volk.17
Asztalos’ work deserves particular emphasis in a discussion of the history of
ideologies in Hungary. He was the first Hungarian historian to juxtapose the su-
perficiality of political activity, the essential subject of historicism, with the pro-
foundness of völkisch politics, which allegedly rested on the laws of nature. He
was also the first to subordinate human agency to a force that existed independ-
ently of history. This force created an interpretive and critical framework for the
assessment of every historical era and event from a fixed, völkisch perspective
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(the only point of view recognized as valid). History lost its autotelic quality and
its open-ended character, while politics and human agency lost the freedom of de-
termining their aims. Furthermore, A nemzetiségek története Magyarországon
constituted the first work of Hungarian völkisch historiography to be met with
broader interest in Hungarian public thinking at the time (first and foremost in
Szekfû’s aforementioned critical review), and it represented the first consistent at-
tempt to rethink Hungarian history through an organic coupling of the findings
and methodologies of German and Hungarian Volksgeschichte. The attention it
was given, however, was not solely a response to the assertions contained in the
text. At the time Hungarian public discourse was growing sensitive to the chal-
lenges issued in the discourses of German scholarship, and in its attempts to offer
replies to these challenges Hungarian intellectual life on the right was gradually
splitting in two. It made little difference that the greater part of Asztalos’s book
had been published some seven years earlier. Its publication in 1934 for the first
time as an independent volume coincided with and no doubt contributed to the ap-
pearance, in mature form, of the reactions to German influence.
Magyar Szemle and Resistance to the Völkisch View of History
While Századok, which had an extensive review section, may have offered the
most detailed expositions of the products of German historiography, Magyar
Szemle was nonetheless the most influential organ of their social reception. Be-
tween 1929 and 1932 one can discern a palpable increase in interest in
Volkswissenschaft and German concepts of foreign policy, but from 1932 this in-
terest turned into deliberate resistance. The turning point may have come when
Otto Albrecht Isbert, a minor German researcher, expounded on the distinctive as-
pects of the völkisch view of history, emphasizing the point that, while “con-
sciousness of völkisch solidarity was increasingly overshadowing the old notion
of the state”, this naturally would not alter the “ineluctable interdependency” of
the German and Hungarian peoples.17 He nonetheless attacked the old Lesser Ger-
man and Greater Hungarian views of history, which in his view “saw only the
state, not the Volk”.18 Mályusz noted this as well in a subsequent essay in which he
characterized the state-centric approach of “Bismarck and his contemporaries” as
outdated, arguing that since 1919 “the state has grown pallid, and its place in polit-
ical thinking has been taken over by the Volkstum, unbound from state borders”.
Turning against Isbert, however, Mályusz cautioned against the threats posed by
the new form of nationalism in German historiography, calling for the invigora-
tion of “Hungarian cultural nationalism,” which “would spur the spiritual resis-
tance of the Hungarian race”.19
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However, Magyar Szemle did not adopt Mályusz’s program of countering the
German challenge by using the methodology of the “invader” to refute his argu-
ments and detect the contours of a strong völkisch Hungarian state in centuries
past and future. On the contrary, the two above-mentioned essays remained some-
thing of an isolated phenomenon. In contrast, a rather homogeneous discourse
was taking shape at the time that brought together critical interrogation of current
politics, philosophy of history and identity politics, and history itself. Adopting
the main premises of Szekfû’s view of history, it attacked the newly emerging
ideological danger. As part of the critical scrutiny of contemporary political ten-
dencies, the works addressing the situation in Germany and Austria specifically
examined the effects of the völkisch idea in the two countries. Shortly before the
publication of the two essays, Gyula Moravek had already analyzed the influence
of the “Volkstum Gedanke”, which he interpreted as a reaction to defeat in the
war, the threat of “Americanization”, and Marxism, anticipating or even presag-
ing the radicalization of these ideas under National Socialism.20 Another essay ex-
amined a further aspect of völkisch ideology in the search for an explanation of the
appeal of Nazi ideas among the petite bourgeoisie and the youth. In the view of its
author, Elek Máthé, “the Germans [were] again on the road towards making them-
selves unpopular among other peoples, not through the parvenu arrogance of Ger-
many under Kaiser Wilhelm, but rather through the deification of their race”.21
Noted historian Béla Pukánszky’s literary review expanded its scope to include
popular literature, arriving at the conclusion that in German literature “the out-
lines of the idealized image of a new ideal collective are emerging”.22 Other writ-
ings called attention to the extremism of Rosenberg’s myths of race and the dan-
ger of a general shift in the political spectrum of the Weimar Republic to the right,
as other parties were swept up in the currents of Nazi radicalism.23
In contrast to the political trends in Germany, Austria, which was also undergo-
ing a general shift to the right (although in the direction of the corporatist state, not
the National Socialist dictatorship), was seen in a considerably more positive
light. In 1932 – quite early – a detailed account of Austrian identity-political en-
deavors was published, emphasizing in particular the work of Joseph Lux and
Friedrich Funder and the allegedly Latin features of the new Austrian self-image.
The account did not fail to mention, however, the fact that a significant segment of
society, in particular the youth, were committed adherents of the grossdeutsch (or
Greater German) idea.24 In an essay published in Magyar Szemle in 1934, Csaba
Csapody took a clear stand in support of the view according to which Dollfuss’s
new order and new creed, which were both “German and independent”, might
prove able to advance the true mission of the German Volk (understood as dissem-
inating culture in Central Europe and declared as having been abandoned in favor
of Nazi saber-rattling), and he strove to maintain an optimistic view of the chances
for the survival of an independent Austria. In general, Magyar Szemle accepted
88 GERGELY ROMSICS
and positively appraised the identity politics project of the corporatist Austrian
state, which it saw as a political ideology that offered Austrians a regional and
open German identity, in contrast to the racial and völkisch premises of National
Socialist thought. Proceeding from a conviction in the power of history to shape a
collective mindset, it was hoped that the new consciousness would inoculate Aus-
trian society against the allure of Nazi ideas, making Austria itself capable of ful-
filling its old historical role in a new form and under new circumstances.25
As a kind of mirror image of this identity project, in writings that were pub-
lished in Magyar Szemle and elsewhere, the same authors, in addition to noting
the threat posed by the German völkisch idea, strove to present an authentic Hun-
garian and conservative political and historical alternative in which the two di-
mensions were inseparably mixed. The historicist outlook became one of the
foundations for fleshing out this alternative. In contrast to the saturation of the
grossdeutsch idea with völkisch ideology, the new conservative-historicist syn-
thesis emphasized “only [the continuity of] the Hungarian political idea”, posi-
tioning it as a notion that permits varied ethnic and cultural attachments and re-
claims community only in the sphere of constitutional questions and foreign pol-
icy. Diverse variations on this idea surfaced repeatedly in the periodical. Jakob
Bleyer, for instance, who as a prominent member of the German minority in Hun-
gary and leader for a time of the Ungarnländische Deutsche Volksbildungsverein
was fighting against his own völkisch opposition, came out in defense of “multi-
lingual and multinational Hungary”, the legacy of which was more universal than
the new and disturbing “Hungarian racial idea”. Hence the “old” formula was
seen as accommodating the nationalities in a firm political alliance within the po-
litical nation. One year later Szekfû harshly criticized the advocates of “Hungar-
ian autotelism”, condemning the forces striving to form a “collective Hungarian
völkisch spirit” and thus forsaking community and solidarity with all the peoples
of historical Hungary.26
This notion found its most detailed expression in Tibor Joó’s works on the his-
tory of ideas. Joó situated historicism and the Hungarian imperial idea in a tightly
intertwined and conceptually interdependent system. Basing his argument on the
idea of the imperative to preserve a place among “great nations”, Joó rejected the
notions of the populist-narodniki writers concerning a future politics based on the
confederation of the Hungarian nation and the other small nations of the region.
He strove to reinvigorate the tradition of the empire-building equestrian Hungar-
ian nomad, who does not represent a force from before history, but rather a histori-
cal people formed over the course of the centuries.27 Furthermore, Magyar Szemle
was combative in its opposition to the similarly racial “Turanism”, which it saw as
a kind of völkisch Orientalism that had turned away from the plan of building a re-
gional empire, a task that history had allegedly assigned to the Hungarian people.
In general, the periodical represented, in its rejection of racial theories of history,
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the historical and voluntary concept of nation and a westward orientation, under-
stood as a necessary consequence of historical experience.28 In an essay published
in Napkelet (The East) in 1929 Gyula Kornis, who also contributed numerous arti-
cles to Magyar Szemle, gave pithy expression to the view according to which,
“whoever considers himself a member of a nation, is a member of that nation”,
and the nation itself, as an “intellectual-ethnical principle”, on the one hand “re-
fers to a community of intellectual and cultural goods” and on the other is mani-
fest through the state in politics.29 Kornis and Joó supported their thesis with refer-
ences to the German bourgeoisie and its contributions to modern Hungary, which
were often the target of attacks by populist-narodniki writers.30
The concept of the historical nation was complemented with an increasingly
precise definition of the Geistesgeschichte version of historicism, i. e., one that
emphasized inter-subjective understandings of the historical situations that
guided the political actions of communities. This touched on the conceptual expo-
sition of the absolute quality of temporality, the unavoidable relativization of his-
torical assessment, and the dependence on perspective, just as it implied the his-
torical genesis of all social phenomena.31 Logically, its application led to the as-
certainment of the primacy of the state and the interrogation and rejection of the
absoluteness of Volkstum, since as an approach Geistesgeschichte rejected any
notion of ahistorical or absolute facts and phenomena.32
The Memory of the Monarchy in Magyar Szemle: The Multinational State
as an Alternative to the Völkisch Idea
The definition of the historical place of the Dual Monarchy by members of the
circle gathered around Magyar Szemle was essentially compatible with Szekfû’s
ideas. György Ottlik, chief editor of the Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie, characterized
the Danubian region as the collision zone of “great historical forces”. In his view,
the enduring achievement of the Habsburgs had been the creation of a local syn-
thesis protecting all the peoples of the region, an accomplishment that had not
since been surpassed, as the emerging German threat was making clear at the time
he was writing.33 In Ottlik’s view, for instance, Czechoslovakia would eventually
have to relinquish any animosity towards its southern neighbors and “seek a
rear-guard in Austria and Hungary, either through a joint restoration of the legiti-
mate heir to the Habsburg throne” or by some other means. Otherwise there would
be no guarantee of its survival.34 The example of Czechoslovakia shed light on
one of the general features of the Danubian territories: given their precarious posi-
tion in the face of external threats, the peoples of the region had to join forces and
find a supranational framework that would ensure the further development of
each.35
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In the view of these authors, this increasingly urgent necessity also demon-
strated that while the collapse of the Dual Monarchy may well have entailed griev-
ous losses for Austria and Hungary from a territorial point of view, from an eco-
nomic and political point of view it had constituted a blow for all the peoples of
the Danubian territories. The obliteration of the division of labor and the assur-
ance of stability represented by the Habsburg Empire made necessary the old-new
“political consciousness, understood in the Danubian sense”, and made dangerous
the “völkisch”, “Turanian”, and “pagan” ideologies that denied the interdepen-
dence of the states and nations of the region.36
Within the limitations of a realistic assessment of the circumstances and possi-
bilities at the time, the authors gathered around Magyar Szemle saw the most fa-
vorable solution to the problems faced (in their assessment) by the peoples of
Central Europe in the revival of some multinational structure, thereby breaking
from the traditional currents of the Hungarian view of history. Their conclusion
entailed a positive reappraisal of the state-building traditions of the Habsburgs.
Ottlik, for instance, declared, “From the perspective of Geistesgeschichte, during
its rule the Habsburg House, standing at the helm of the vast Austrian empire, be-
came the clearest representative of the ‘European’ Volk”.37
These conclusions did not, however, entail a complete purging of any memory
of the Habsburg-Hungarian conflicts from the texts. Among the authors who gath-
ered around Szekfû, Mihály Ferdinandy, for instance, preserved numerous ele-
ments of the Protestant kuruc tradition. He considered the Hungarian Volk to be
“one of the small peoples oppressed by the Gesamtmonarchie”, and viewed the
Habsburgs as an obstacle to “natural development” and the revival of the “flexi-
ble, old, humanist Hungarian state idea of the Middle Ages”. In contrast to
Szekfû, Ferdinandy was unambiguous in his claim, in connection with the history
of the eighteenth century, that both the course and the limits of development had
been determined by the dynasty, and even Domokos Kosáry, a student of
Szekfû’s, contended that when the two had come into conflict, the interests of the
dynasty had always prevailed over the interests of the Hungarian territories.38
If in connection with the eighteenth century one observes the emergence of
competing interpretations, assessments of the Reform Era show a broad consen-
sus. The authors of Magyar Szemle and the writers who held similar views shared
Kosáry’s conclusion, according to which “the reign of Francis I, which lasted
from 1792 to 1830, meant a lost generation for Hungary”.39 Ferdinandy viewed
1848 as a justified response to “the blindness, ill-will, and unintelligence of the
government at the turn of the century”, while Kornis saw the struggle for inde-
pendence as part of the tradition of constitutionalism that had evolved against the
absolutist tendencies of the ruling house.40
These assessments were not, however, accompanied by any supposition of an
underlying necessary opposition between the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungar-
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ian Volk. The era of Habsburg reaction, in other words the negative “other side” of
the Reform Era, remained a period characterized by increasingly tense conflict be-
tween two interdependent political actors, a conflict the origins of which simply
lay in the mistakes of the Habsburg House. This opposition, however, was not
cloaked in any historical-philosophical garb, nor was it cast as an eternal or inevi-
table antithesis of interest.
The portrayal of the period as a matter of mere incident enabled the authors to
interpret 1867 as an unambiguous expression of newly discovered harmony. In
the anti-völkisch and anti-German discourse of Magyar Szemle the Compromise
constituted proof of both the interdependence of Hungary and the Habsburg dy-
nasty and the viability of a new (or rather old) order in the Danubian region based
on concord and consensus, not Volkstum or völkisch ideology (nor on an absolutist
and unitary basis). Criticism was leveled at the consequences of the Compromise,
rather than its principles, including the liberal-nationalist assimilationist furor that
engulfed many members of the political class, directing energies away from pro-
jects of prosperity in the multinational state towards a fight both with the dynasty
and the nationalities over issues of purely symbolic significance.41 In contrast, the
Monarchy was seen as the bearer of genuine, attainable promise, a state the shared
dynastic and Hungarian tradition of which had been “precisely that it melted and
merged traditions… it had had the spirit of a pastor, tending to its peoples, in other
words flocks, at least until the sheep turned into consciously nationalistic
wolves”.42 The authors only differed in their assessments of the Compromise as
either a momentary or an absolute optimum.43
Thus 1867 grew into a mythical moment, an expression of both the resurrection
of the thousand-year Hungarian political tradition and the conclusion of the de-
cades-long political battle waged out of necessity against Vienna. For Szekfû, the
Hungarian instinct for politics, and thus the claim to empire, was proof of the “ma-
ture political realism” forged in “centuries-old foundries” (to offer a summary of
his view of the essence of the Compromise, in lieu of a long-winded analysis of
Magyar Történet, the five-volume history book by Gyula Szekfû and Bálint
Hóman published in 1935).44 In addition to figuring as evidence of Hungarian po-
litical acuity, 1867 was also often cast as a turning point in Szekfû’s writings that
essentially abrogated the conflict-ridden system of relations between the Habs-
burg House and the Hungarians. According to István Bethlen, prime minister
from 1921 to 1931 and considered Szekfû’s foremost ally, before 1867 the
Habsburgs “had seen the calling of their rule in the territories of the Monarchy as
the creation, out of their entire empire, of a state under unified Austrian German
leadership, preferably with a German-speaking government”. The Compromise
made it clear that the dynasty had had a startling realization: “Its function was not
to lay the foundation for the hegemony of the German Volk on its territory”. It rec-
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ognized that “new tasks had arisen”, thereby marking the beginning of a new era
of cooperation and collaboration.45
It is significant that the stances of Ottlik and Ferdinandy, the two authors who
were the most critical of the Habsburgs, were more favorable in their assessments
of 1867 specifically than of Habsburg rule in general. In 1934 Ottlik characterized
the Habsburg concept of the state as an idea of “general servitude,” counterbal-
anced as of 1867 by the open and tolerant “alternative” of Hungarian civilization.
In 1936, however, he wrote admiringly of the Compromise in absolute terms, in
other words not merely as an improvement over the state structure of the earlier
period, but as a good solution in and of itself, and he identified the Habsburg Em-
pire as the state with the most European mentality of the Great Powers.46 Simi-
larly, in 1941 Ferdinandy, who earlier had described the Habsburg state as a
“swooning” empire disfigured by the “rigid, centuries-old mask” of the dynasty,
celebrated the restoration of the Empire in modern form and the reestablishment
of the “ancient German–Hungarian equilibrium” by “Hungarian statesmen” and
the “wisdom” of Francis Joseph.47 He assessed the Compromise on the basis of the
fact that after 1867, “the Habsburg Monarchy was able once more, and for the fi-
nal time, to continue in its role as a Great Power”, while “the Hungarian kingdom
again was able to continue its imperial tradition, if perhaps within certain lim-
its”.48
As an interpretive move, the decision to place the Compromise on a pedestal
demanded an explanation for the collapse of the Monarchy, and first and foremost
historical Hungary, other than the inadequacies of the state system of the Dualist
Era. The explanation, however, was at hand. Since the publication of Szekfû’s
Három Nemzedék (Three Generations) in 1920, critical assaults on pre-1918 Hun-
garian politics were continuously cropping up, whether in Ottlik’s 1933 Új
Hungária (New Hungary) or in the articles published in Magyar Szemle. The at-
tacks focused in particular on political nationalism and chauvinism, which had
broken with the autochthonous, tolerant Hungarian imperial idea created by the
circumstances of history and the nomadic legacy of the steppes.49 This interpreta-
tion stood in sharp contradistinction to the völkisch imperial idea, which de-
manded firmness of purpose and offered an antithetical assessment of the era. The
discourse called the restraint and political realism of the 1867 generation of politi-
cians (Ferenc Deák, Gyula Andrássy, etc.) to account, in other words the premise,
which the Habsburgs had learned to esteem in 1867, that history is not a cycle of
collisions of völkisch wills, but rather the representation of interests spanning the
stages of ever-shifting, open-ended historical development and manifest first and
foremost, in the spirit of political realism, in the search for compromise. Firm de-
mands stemming from faith in absolutes constitute little more than stubborn deni-
als of the “other” absolute. The historicist tendencies shared by Szekfû and others
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saw the völkisch idea as one such combative ideology, taking issue with its (per-
ceived or real) core assumptions and thereby developing into a synthesis of Hun-
garian conservative and traditional liberal views of history, as well as the most
thorough and consistent attempt between the two World Wars to formulate a
historicist idea of Hungarian identity.
Conclusion
As the most prominent journal of public conservative thinking in Hungary in
the 1930s, Magyar Szemle functioned in part as a site of resistance to the tenden-
cies of the conservative revolution and völkisch ideology emanating from Ger-
many. Interestingly, the authors of Magyar Szemle confronted not only the
essentialist ideologies of ascendant National Socialism, but also the ideologically
and methodologically similar (even derivative), if politically opposed, notions of
the Volk as the guiding principle and ultimate end of history in Hungary as well.
As an organ of opposition to völkisch ideologies, whether German or Hungarian,
Magyar Szemle represented an attempt to preserve political conservatism from
ethnic essentialisms. This article sought to reconstruct the intellectual mobiliza-
tion undertaken by Gyula Szekfû with the aim of demonstrating how the völkisch
challenge had to first be identified as such and could subsequently be proven to be
an “inappropriate” logic for interpreting Hungarian history. Interestingly, the
anti-völkisch mobilization rested not merely on the widespread dislike for Nazism
among contributors, but also on their interpretation of Hungary as a site of coexis-
tence under imperial supervision provided by the “core” nation, Hungarians. In
this sense, the conservative mobilization and its ideology may hold little appeal
today, yet it nevertheless demonstrated the incompatibilities between interwar old
and new right-wing thinking, and the potential conservative thought held at the
time as a reservoir of counter-ideology to German penetration.
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